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BUSAN, South Korea: North Korea on Tuesday (Oct 15) destroyed inter-Korean roads and rail lines along the demilitarised zone between the two Koreas, further escalating cross-border tensions and raising concerns about the risk of conflict.

The roads and rail lines, once seen as a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation, were built during periods of relaxed peninsular tension - usually at South Korea’s expense.

They were symbols of rapprochement, of the effort by various reconciliation-minded Southern administrations to reach out to Pyongyang. They were markers of an elusive normalcy between the two states.

That North Korea was willing to destroy them - for no clear gain - makes evident how determined the Pyongyang regime is to abjure normalcy with its neighbour. Even roads that were scarcely used were too much. Inter-Korean relations are once again in a freeze.

WHY BLOW UP APOLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?

North Korea is poor. This is the defining attribute of its political economy. Its most modern infrastructure was built by Chinese and South Korean firms operating in the country. North Korea has less than 1,000 miles of paved road, and outside of the capital, bridges are regularly damaged by weather. It is curious, therefore, that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would order the destruction of scarce roadwork.

North Korea does not tell us anything about its choices, of course, but there are probably domestic and international reasons. It vowed last week to "permanently shut” its border with the South and briefly ordered troops to stand prepared to fire after accusing Seoul of flying drones over its capital.

Inter-Korean relations tend to deteriorate when South Korea is governed by conservatives. South Korea’s liberals and progressives are more dovish on North Korea than the conservatives. Progressives regularly pursue outreach to the North and have often clashed with the United States over how intensely to enforce sanctions. They also suggest aid to North Korea, often with minimal conditions, and de-emphasise human rights problems in the North.

Unsurprisingly, Pyongyang prefers these doves in the presidency. Under former South Korean president Moon Jae-in, there were several inter-Korean summits. When Mr Moon stepped down in 2022, Mr Kim thanked him for his efforts at improving relations, a rare gesture of goodwill.

In contrast, conservative presidents are more hawkish. They emphasise deterrence, sanctions, denuclearisation and alignment with the Americans. Pyongyang resents this and typically expresses its displeasure in a spectacular, made-for-TV way.

Missile launches are a common gimmick. But the symbolism of these roads as inter-Korean projects makes them a useful tool to hit back at South Korea’s current tough-minded government.

CHINA AND RUSSIA NOW STAND WITH NORTH KOREA

Internationally, North Korea’s regional position is better than it has been in years. It can consequently pursue a tougher line against South Korea.

Mr Kim announced this year that he would cease reunification activities with the South. North Korea, he said, will treat South Korea as a foreign and hostile power. Symbols of inter-Korean reconciliation in North Korea have been pulled down. These roads are the latest move in this campaign.

North Korea has never actually wanted unification. Peninsular integration would almost certainly be led by the South, which has a massive advantage in resources and technical skills. Any meaningful Korean federation – even without full unification - would eventually be dominated by the South.

If Korean unity ever occurs, it will likely result from North Korea’s implosion rather than the Kim family’s assent. But North Korea did maintain the pretense. It went through the motions that the two Koreas should be together, that North and South were equal brothers, just with different systems.

But today’s international environment is good enough for North Korea that it can drop the pretense. Most importantly, North Korea is now far ahead of South Korea regarding nuclear weapons.

This asymmetry gives North Korea leverage over the South; North Korea will likely use it to bully South Korea in future crises. And the permanency and rapid expansion of North Korean nukes and missiles make the country much less vulnerable. Inter-Korean pieties are no longer necessary.

Pyongyang’s diplomatic position is similarly good. The US and China are now decoupling and falling into what the Americans call “great power competition”.

Previously, China would occasionally cooperate with the US on North Korean issues. For example, it voted for nine United Nations sanctions packages on Pyongyang. But those days are over. China is now clearly competing with the US and, consequently, will do little to push North Korea over its weapons of mass destruction.

Russia, too, is much closer to North Korea now than in the past. Russia also voted for those sanctions packages. But like China, it no longer bothers to enforce them.

Indeed, Russian diplomatic action at the UN this year significantly crippled sanctions oversight. North Korea can now easily skirt those restrictions. Neither Moscow nor Beijing will take action to stop North Korean evasion.

Russia has also partially aligned itself with North Korea in the context of the Ukraine war. North Korea has provided ammunition for that conflict. We do not know what Russia has given in response. But Russian alienation from much of the world means that it will not turn on North Korea now.

Western analysts worry that China, Russia, North Korea and Iran are congealing into an axis of authoritarianism. Certainly, they are cooperating more closely because of the Ukraine war. North Korea benefits tremendously from this. China and Russia are now much closer to it, will not enforce sanctions, and will not push it on weapons of mass destruction. With friends like those, Pyongyang can afford to literally burn its bridges with Seoul.

Robert Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly) is a professor of political science at Pusan National University.